SELKEI

Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80R01720R066800100010-8

SAVA 73-139

23 July 1973

| MEMORAND | UM FOR: |
|----------------|--|
| | Assistant Deputy Director for Operations |
| | |
| SUBJECT | : Proposed Note to Dr. Kissinger on |
| | "Strength of CIA Station in |
| | South Vietnam" |
| | |
| | |
| 7 177 | |
| 1. 1. hh 25 | he phased curtailment of the Saigon Station's strength |
| by about 25 | over the next two years recommended by Mr. Shackley |
| on the basis | of a reassessment in which Mr. Polgar participated |
| seems to me | a wise move on two counts: |
| _ | . Its intrinsic merits. |
| d | . its intrinsic merits. |
| · . | . The fact that if we are curtailing our |
| . | own strength, we will be in a better |
| | position to encourage our military |
| | colleagues and, to |
| | trim their complements to the size |
| | that is really needed. |
| • | and an a second . |
| 2. As | s a point of advocacy not substance I would suggest |
| for your con | sideration the following language as a possible |
| alternative t | to the final sentence in the first paragraph of the |
| proposed no | te to Dr. Kissinger: |

25X1

25X1

We would therefore propose to implement the conclusions of this reassessment by making these reductions incrementally 25X1

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over the next two years. This proposal is of course based on the planning assumptions that there will be no sharp rise in active military operations in South Vietnam over the next two years nor any major, nationwide political crisis in that country. If the actual course of events should render either of these planning assumptions invalid, we would naturally have to reconsider the strength reductions envisaged in this proposal.

George A. Carver, Jr.

George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

cc: Mr. Shackley

25X1

O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver/mee

Orig - Addressee

1 - C/EA

1 - C/VNO

l - Memos From EA/VNO

1 - GAC Chrono

1 - VAS Chrono